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Abstract 
The purpose is to compare the perfect Stochastic Return (SR) model like Islamic banks to the 
Fixed Return (FR) model as in conventional banks by measuring up their impacts at the 
macroeconomic level. We prove that if the optimal choice of share’s investor in SR model 𝛼∗ 
realizes the indifference of the financial institution toward SR and FR models, there exists 
𝛼 < 𝛼∗ such that the banks strictly prefers the SR model. Also, there exists 𝛼, 𝛾 and 𝜆 verifying 
the conditions of α-sharing such that each party in economy can be better under the SR model 
and the economic welfare could be improved in a Pareto-efficient way.  
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the stochastic return model i.e. applied by 
Islamic banks to the fixed return model i.e. followed by traditional banks. The 
comparison will be done by measuring up the impacts of each model at the 
macroeconomic level. The commercial financing model stipulates a fixed payoff as the 
retribution of financial capital use even if this latter does not generate a profit for the 
investor. In contrast, the Islamic financial contract must specify only the sharing of the 
return from the project between the investor and the financier.  
The basic hypotheses are specified in order to prove which one of two models is 
more efficient and could improve social welfare (Khan, 1989). There are two forms of 
finance are available to investors in different economic activities, Stochastic Return 
Model (SR) and Fixed Return Model (FR). The Stochastic Return is based directly on 
the investment profitability, while Fixed Return is independent of the investment 
outcome. Nevertheless, historically the interest rate charged by banks has been 
considerably lower than the unobservable profit rate. Several reasons may be adduced 
in support of each hypothesis.  
The hypotheses are related to: firstly supply and demand of financial funds in the 
financial market, secondly sharing information system and finally the attitudes to risks 
mainly for the macro-investor (Siddiqi, 2004). The monetary base, generated initially 
by a central bank, constitutes the supply of available financial funds in the economy 
which can be either used as credit or as corporation to productive sectors. The decisions 
depend upon the disposable contracts in the financial market. Two principal agents are 
concerned directly to make such decisions, banks or financial institutions as manager 
of finance flows, and the investors as manager of real flows.  
The paper is organized as following, in second section economic, financial 
hypothesis and technical are presented. Third section displays the risk aversion under 
SR and FR models. Fourth section exhibits the determination of a best choice, fifth 
reveals the Pareto-efficiency, and last section concludes by the main findings.  
 
2. Hypotheses 
2.1 Economic and Financial Hypothesis 
In fact, the aggregate saving is deduced from saving decisions which are based strictly 
on the level of income. So theoretically the aggregate saving of households does not 
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depend on the interest rate even if they have deposits in banks. These financial 
resources are mobilized costly by banks in their credit system. At this stage, it is easy 
to argue that the saving decision and the investing decision are two distinct operations. 
A higher remuneration should be attached to the active one (Balestra and Baranzini, 
1971).   
In light of the previous definitions and principles it is possible to spell out the 
following hypotheses required for the comparison of SR’s model to FR’s model. The 
Financial market is unambiguous (H1), this assumption explains that in regular 
economic conditions, the investment projects are not correlated. When the business 
cycle is in the downswing, i.e. during a recession banks expect profit to decline, the 
losses would spread throughout the credit market. In this context, the FR’s model leads 
to a series of bankruptcies of banks, whereas the SR’s model constitutes an advantage 
because the two contractual parties would strive conjointly to minimize lose and could 
reorient in other way the investment project.      
The hypothesis of Separation (H2) requires that the performance of project is no 
correlated to financing decision. Formally the production function is independent of 
whether the funds are from debt (FR) or equity in the common sense (SR)1. At least 
this absence of correlation between technical production and financial mode of 
activities of firm could be justify since the marginal productivity of capital, ceteris-
paribus, should be independent of whether the new investment is raised via debt or 
equity. The efforts of investor are identical across different financial contracts. This 
assumption avoids the latent problem of moral hazard.  
The drawback of this hypothesis is that it rules out incentive effects associated with 
the ownership structure of the firm. This is true essentially for FR’s model, because the 
SR’s model implies joint ownership. Furthermore, considering the investor, the major 
reason for its preference of debt is the existence of a moral hazard problem in the credit 
market. The hypothesis of Risk aversion (H3) indicates that the investors are not free 
of risk aversion. For the SRs model, this hypothesis is realistic and could be explained 
by the widespread use of equity in the firm’s capital structure. While the existence of 
credit market and stock market reveals the aspiration of firms to build up various 
                                                           
1 Here the concept of equity does not mean the sharing system of exchange stock. It is based on 
the direct participation in the production corporate i.e. sharing system of production with 
optimal distribution of risk.   
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contracts forms for shifting risk to creditors. In fact, the choice of contract form 
depends more on the attitude of the investors towards risk.  
The hypothesis of Identical return likelihood (H4) 2 suggests that the investors and 
banks have identical and costless information. This hypothesis is reliable to the rational 
expectations on each side either investor-producer or investor-bank. It supposes also 
weak differential of information structure. The alternative hypothesis could show that 
debt will be preferred even if the investor seems to be more risk averse and he can’t 
reach the upper tail of the return likelihood. In fact the investor can costlessly observe 
the performance of his project. He can provoke asymmetrical information in the credit 
market. Especially since the debt requires minimal information of the project. Thus, 
the availability of costless and minimal information could generate the problem of 
moral hazard.  
The SRs model does not have any collateral requirement. But banks to avoid this 
problem require collateral. In this way the FRs model ejects potential investors. As 
such the SRs model overcomes this problem and there may be a lot more investors in 
the economy with more risky investment but higher expected return.  
 
2.2 Technical Hypotheses 
The first one is related to the Funds and returns of investment (H5). Considering L  as 
the total supply of investment funds: 
21 ZZL   ;   
L Z 1   &  LZ )1(2    with    10    
where iZ  is the amount of funds financing investment projects according to the i  
model; 1i  corresponds to SR model and 2i  represents the FR model.  
Let ii RZ  be the amount of profits made by investors in i  model where iR  is the 
rate of return on investment, it is considered a stochastic variable and having real and 
positive values:        
                                                           
2 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed that with imperfect information, the firms can be credit 
rationing. They argue that asymmetry of information between banks and borrowers, leads to the 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Given lack of information available to banks 
concerning the true risk level of each loan, they charge interest rates according to the average 
expected level of risk.  
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 2RR ,i.i.d. ~ iR      10  iR  
where  iR RE  and  iR RVi 
2 .  This distribution implies that:  
   iiii REZRZE    
    iiii RVZRZV
2  
Formally, the FR model is the dominant financial system based on loans. It consists 
to allow a quantity of money (principal) to the investor on the condition that the 
principal plus a fixed interest (as a fixed percent return on principal) is payable on a 
fixed future time by a fixed amount of money noted  DZ 12  where D  is the interest 
rate charged by bank. If the earnings fall below this fixed amount, then a lesser amount 
will be paid: 
if DDR   receive  lllender  wi  the:2   
                if 22   entire    thereceive  lllender  wi  the: RDR   
In contrast, formally the SR model is a financial system based on profit sharing. In 
this model the financier would receive a share of the project’s return. In case of loss, 
no party gets anything.  
The second one concerns the Aggregate payoffs of financier and investor (H6). It is 
supposed that no collateral is required from investors in two models. In the FR model, 
the financial contract stipulates:  
   ,min 222 DRZP                 0 ,max 222 DRZY             10  D  
where 2P  is a semi-stochastic variable and 2Y  is a stochastic variable, they represent 
the aggregate payoffs for banks (lenders) and for investors (borrowers) respectively.  
Whereas, in the SR model, the financial contract stipulates: 
   1 111 RZP                111 RZY              10   
where 1P  and 1Y  are stochastic aggregate payoffs for financiers (with a share 1 ) 
and investors respectively. After these specifications, the problem is to determine the 
best or preferred contract in the financial market i.e. the Pareto-Optimal contract3.  
                                                           
3 The allocation of resources in an economy is Pareto-optimal (efficient), if it is not possible to 
change the allocation of resources in such a way as to make some one better off without making 
others worse off. 
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3. Expectation and Risk Aversion 
3.1 Expectation of Payoffs 
How we can determine the financier’s attitude toward the financial model as the total 
supply of funds L  is allocated to projects according to SR and FR models? We should 
calculate the expected payoff under these models. In the FR model, the expected payoff 
for the financier is giving by: 
            DRELDREZDRZEPE ,min 1,min,min 222222   
            DRVLZDRVZDRZVP ,min 1,min,minV 222
2
2222   
In the SR model, it is given by: 
            111111  111 RELREZRZEPE    
            11
2
1
2
1
2
111  Z111 RVLRVZRZVPV    
Since the financier is supposed to be risk averse (H3) like investor, it is important 
to examine his expected utility (assumed to be continuous) in order to identify his 
preference for any model. Also the bargaining financial process is assumed continuous. 
The financier will be indifferent between SR and FR models if he will receive the same 
expected payoff.  
 
3.2 Risk Aversion under SR and FR Models 
We have two ways to determine the best contract. It is possible for the investor to find 
D  and   so that: ,D  exist such that    21 YEYE  . It remains that at this point, the 
choice of the contract depends on the preference of the financier.  
Also, it is possible to assume that the financier assumed is risk neutral to find D  
and   so that: ,D  exist such that    21 PEPE  . At this point, the choice of the 
contract depends on the preference of the investor. We choose this approach by 
assuming that the financier is risk averse. Because the investor represents the demand 
side and he can choose the appropriate source of funds, either from SR or FR, to 
financing his productive investment’s efforts. 
Proposition 3.1: Let a fixed D , 10    and 
2
1
 : then it exists *  such 
that    12 PEPE  . And for 
*  : then    12 PEPE  . (See Proof in Annex) 
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This result indicates that the bank may become indifference between the two 
models. In contrast, if a greater portion of investment funds are allocated to the FR 
model, the previous result shows that the financier prefers strictly the FR model. So the 
expected payoff in FR model is great than in SR model for all  . The choice of model 
is based on its expected payoff, the bank strictly prefers the SR model which gives a 
higher expected payoff.  
At this stage, the choice of the contract depends on the attitude of investor toward 
risk. If the investor is risk neutral, the result can be apprehended via a specific version 
of Miller-Modigliani (MM) theorem (Miller and Modigliani, 1961; Stiglitz, 1969; 
Miller, 1988). The celebrated MM theorem asserts that the value of the firm, in a given 
risk class, is independent of its capital structure i.e. irrelevance of the choice of financial 
model. This theorem does not suppose the risk aversion, and then it can’t capture this 
attitude of an investor.  
 
4. Determination of a Best Choice 
Hypothesis 3 of risk aversion raises some difficulties in reaching the solution to the 
best choice. In order to precisely find the solution, the expected utility of the payoff 
will be important, mainly the point where this utility is identical under the two models.  
Firstly, a risk averter i.e. investor would prefer a less risky income flow among 
flows having the same expected payoff. Then it remains important to determine the 
riskiness associated to payoffs in the two models. From FR model and SR model, we 
have respectively: 
 0,222 DRmax ZY   and   11111 RZR ZY    
and at 
* , it exists    21
* : YEYED    
Consider U  the aggregate utility function of the investors. U  is supposed bounded 
and 0U ''  (i.e. risk aversion). Since the expected payoff of the investors is identical 
in SR and FR models if      21 YUEYUE  . Under the risk aversion, the SR model 
will be preferred so that: 
     21 YUEYUE   
because the investor in FR model is more inclined to risk and his expected payoff would 
be less.  
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This result must be proved and can be expressed in the following proposition. To 
capture the proprieties of R , it is important to define the sharing  rule and the 
Mean Preserving Spread (MPS) in the next definitions (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970 
and 1971):  
Definition of sharing : An sharing  rule is a real function  RS  such that 
(Merton, 1992; Levy, 2006): 
(i)   10  RRS  
(ii)       RSRERSE    where   is the sharing rate for investors. 
(iii)   
k
k RS 1  where k  stands for shareholder in risk investment.  
Definition of MPS: A Mean-Preserving Spread of sharing  is defined as follows: 
    212 ZRSRS YY   
where  2RSY  is a mean-preserving spread of  1RSY  and 2Z  is a random variable 
that is statistically independent of  1RSY  such that   0 iZiZE   and 
  02 
iZi
ZV  .4 The stochastic variable Y  stands for the aggregate payoffs for 
investors. The theoretical mean will be defined as: 
          1212 RSEZERSERSE YYY    
and the preserving spread is defined as follows:  
      222212 121 RZRYY ZRSVRSV    
Intuitively, it is easy to expect that the risk averse associated with  1RS  implies 
the preference of  1RSY  to  2RSY . Indeed, the risk aversion shows that  2RSY  is 
riskier than  1RSY .   
Proposition 4.1: Consider    0,max 22 YY DRRS   and    YP DRRS ,min 22   
where YS  and PS  verify the conditions (i) to (iii). Then, for any concave and bounded 
utility function U and any sharing  rule  RS  particularly  1RSY , we have  
                                                           
4 This strong hypothesis can be replaced by the uncorrelated random variables. And any function 
of  iY RS  is uncorrelated of any function of iZ . 
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           212 RSUERSUERSUE YYP  .  
(See Proof in Annex) 
We can prove separately the double inequality straightforwardly by using a MPS of 
sharing  and the Taylor expansion at degree two. This result exhibits that any risk 
aversion agent would prefer the sharing  of   2RSP  to sharing  of  1RSY . 
In consequence,  2RSP  is preferred to  1RSY  which is preferred to  2RSY . The 
proposition also exhibits by transitivity that the sharing -investor of  1RSY  
would be preferred to the sharing  of  2RSY . This result shows that in terms of 
sharing  and of expected payoff the SR model seems to be better than the FR 
model.  
 
5. Pareto Efficiency 
This central concept is widely accepted standard for comparing economic outcomes. 
There are many efficient situations in which the active agent tends to avoid the 
inefficiency. Our proposition identifies inefficiency situations and it is important to 
designing policies and institutions that will promote efficiency and reduce inefficiency.  
The financier in FR model in order to avoid many problems like moral hazard, 
adverse selection, bankruptcy could reduce Pareto-efficiently his weak risk aversion by 
improving the outcomes of investors in economy through the reallocation of payoffs. 
It is optimal that the financier immunes all investors (in macroeconomic view) and 
adopts the SR model. This must increase the correlation between the ownership and 
capital structure such that we have next Pareto-Optimal payoffs:  
           212
~~~
RSUERSUERSUE YYP   
 
Proposition 5.1: Each party (investors and financiers) can be better in SR model and 
the economic welfare could be improved in a Pareto efficiency way. (See Proof in 
Annex) 
 
6. Conclusion 
The SR model seems to be Pareto-Optimal Contract and proves the inferiority of the 
FR contract i.e. debt model. But the credit market dominates throughout the world. 
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Furthermore, the Pareto-optimal solution could improve the payoff of financier in the 
FR model if the payoff of SR model has been increased and the additional outcomes 
would be distributed in half with the other investors operating in FR model.  
These arrangements permit that these moves are likely to be Pareto-Optimal. The 
SR model has the spreading risk more evenly than the FR model, and considering the 
risk aversion of the investors, then the SR model dominates the FR model and the 
higher outcomes should be associated with the active one i.e. the SR investor. In 
addition, the SR model has far-reaching impacts for the stability of a financial system. 
So this result is very opportune for the financial policy purposes. The real 
macroeconomic investment might be higher in the SR model than in the FR model at 
least because it doesn’t require imperative collateral and it could reward the riskier 
agent.  
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Annex 
Proof proposition 3.1: Consider a continuous function  h :      12 PEPEh   
          12 1,min1 RLEDRLEh    
         12 ,min10 REDRELh    and           0,min11 2  DRELh             
If         0D,Rmin
2
1
0:
2
1
12  REELh , (by using intermediate value 
theorem). If   00:
2
1
 h , but if   00:
2
1
 h . As h  is continuous and 
2
1
 , it exists *  :      10 * hhh    and   0* h . For *0   : 
     210 PEPEh    
 
Proof proposition 4.1: Letting  1RSY  the random sharing  rate, and U  the utility 
function of  RS  which is assumed with risk averse i.e.    0'' RSU . The expected 
utility of  RS  is    RSUE .  
       
     
         221
''
21
'
1
212
2
1
                 ZRSUZRSURSU
ZRSURSU
YYY
YY


 
Then, the expected value gives:   
  
               
            0     ,  
2
1
                      
2
1
2
21
''
1
2
21
''
21
'
12


iYY
YYYY
ZEZERSUERSUE
ZRSUEZRSUERSUERSUE
 
            0 and 0     ,   21''21 2  ZYYY σRSUERSUERSUE     
In the same way, the second inequality shows that  1RSY  is riskier than  2RSP . 
By using a MPS there exists 1Z  is a random variable such that     121 ZRSRS PY   
which  2RSP  is a random sharing  rate. The expected utility gives:  
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               
            0     ,  
2
1
                      
2
1
2
12
''
2
2
12
''
12
'
21


iPP
PPPY
ZEZERSUERSUE
ZRSUEZRSUERSUERSUE
 
            0 and 0     ,   22''12 1  ZPYP σRSUERSUERSUE .   ■ 
 
Proof proposition 5.1: From the proposition 1, for all      0:,0 *   h and 
   21 PEPE   i.e. the financier would prefer SR model. U  is continuous and concave 
(i.e. risk aversion):  
it exists       such that  11:,0;1,1 ***    
       12 RSUERSUE PP        12 1,min RUEDRUE P    
This solution is Pareto-optimal. But it is possible to find another solution which can 
improve the payoff of the banks in FR model, and the lenders strictly prefer the SR 
model: it exists
 
    ,0, *
2
    such that 
*
2
11     
       121221 1,1min RUEDRUE P    
Also, it exists       such  that :,0, **    
       12 RSUERSUE YY         12 0,max RUEDRUE Y    
It is possible to improve in Pareto-Optimal way the payoffs of investors in FR without 
changing the investor preference for the SR model, and the borrowers strictly prefer 
the SR model: it exists     *
2
*
2
such that  ,0,     
       121221 0,1max RUEDRUE Y   .  ■ 
